By ALEXANDER J. MOTYL
05/25/24
The Hill
Vladimir Putin’s recent government reshuffle has produced a flood of oftentimes contradictory assessments, but there’s general agreement that the appointment of Andrei Belousov as minister of defense is a plus for the regime. He’s been called a “respected economist,” a “technocrat,” and, my favorite, a “fan of Rembrandt.”
Which is to say that Belousov is supposedly no mere thug, like so many of Putin’s shadowy pals, but a genuine professional — the right man for the job of eliminating rampant corruption within the armed forces and integrating the military economy into the civilian economy (or vice versa).
In fact, Belousov is almost certain to fail. His appointment is thus less a stroke of genius by Russia’s self-elected president than a sign, yet again, of the great leader’s incompetence.
Start with the fact that Belousov graduated from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University in 1981 — with distinction, no less. Note the year: The late 1970s and early 1980s were the period of High Brezhnevism — what Mikhail Gorbachev later called the “era of stagnation.”
While the USSR excelled in the hard sciences — as these were immune to contamination by Soviet ideology — Soviet economics, like the Soviet study of history and law, wasn’t quite the empirically and theoretically driven discipline practiced in the West. It’s for that reason perhaps that the liberal Russian opposition economist Vladimir Milov says that Belousov is a good mathematician but a bad economist.
Small wonder that Belousov is apparently committed to a dirigiste model of economic development, whereby the state — not the free market — plays an overriding role in decisions regarding investment, production and consumption. One Russian commentator has called Belousov a “gosplanshchik” — or follower of the Gosplan, the State Planning Committee responsible for mismanaging the centrally planned Soviet economy and ultimately driving it toward collapse. Dirigisme accords with Putin’s preferences and it may help militarize the Russian economy — but at what cost to average Russians?
Worse still for Belousov’s reputation is that he’s been part of the Putin regime for close to two decades. Here’s how Reuters summarized his career: “In 2000, Belousov was appointed a non-staff adviser to the Russian prime minister and joined the economy ministry as deputy minister six years later. From 2008-2012, he was director of the department for economics and finance in the government apparatus, the same years Putin served as prime minister. In 2012, he was made economics minister. From 2013 until 2020, Belousov served as adviser to the Russian president. From 2020, he worked as first deputy prime minister. When Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin got COVID in 2020, Belousov briefly took on the prime minister’s duties while Mishustin got better.”
In a word, Belousov is Putin’s man and an integral part of the profoundly corrupt mafia-like regime he has constructed. Can a technocrat and fan of Rembrandt really remain aloof from the corrupt practices endemic to the system, or should we assume that anyone with such a long track record of serving a get-rich-quick tyrant may have appropriated some of the disreputable habits of his colleagues?
Either way, Belousov won’t be able to rid the armed forces of corruption. If he’s clean, everyone will hate and refuse to cooperate with him, especially if he looked the other way for 20 years. If he’s dirty, he won’t do more than pretend to scratch the surface.
Finally, there’s the fact that Belousov has very little experience dealing with bureaucracies in general and their worst possible embodiment, Russia bureaucracy, in particular. Russia’s Ministry of Defense has some 10 deputy ministers and scores of inspectorates, directorates and agencies. Will he be able to navigate these dangerous waters?
Complicating things, Belousov, the mathematically inclined economist, will have to find a common language with General Valery Gerasimov, a seasoned army man who serves as chief of the General Staff. More likely than not, they will talk past each other and quickly develop a cool relationship, all the more so if Belousov decides that he needs to prove his worth by meddling in military affairs.
Putin’s decision to promote Belousov isn’t just a mistake; it has all the earmarks of yet another of his many strategic errors. Russia is embroiled in a war that it cannot win anytime soon, if ever, and that is costing the nation staggering numbers of dead and wounded. Russian planes, ships and refineries are being destroyed with clockwork regularity.
The last thing Russia’s armed forces need is chaos within the decision-making institutions responsible for the war. Naturally, this is exactly what Ukraine wants and needs.
So, why did Putin commit yet another blunder? Because he, like Belousov, is as much a creature of the system as its creator. Mafia-like old boy networks aren’t known for innovative thinking and problem solving. And Russia’s visibly aged capo di tutti capi, in office for an exceptionally long quarter century, is especially prone to mediocrity and the violence he hopes will compensate for his rampant incompetence.
Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”