OPINION
Amid a litany of missed chances and missteps, the Biden administration’s policy blunders and hesitant strategies shaped the US response to Putin’s war against Ukraine.
By Jason Jay Smart
January 17, 2025
Kyiv Post
This combination of file pictures created on January 2, 2022 shows Russia’s President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscu on March 1, 2018, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kiev on December 8, 2021 and US President Joe Biden in Wilmington, Delaware on January 15, 2021. US President Joe Biden and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky are due to speak by phone on January 2, 2022, amid growing fears that a Russian military buildup near the border with its pro-Western neighbor heralds an invasion. The show of US support for Ukraine comes days after Biden warned Russian President Vladimir Putin of severe consequences if Moscow invades the former Soviet country. (Photo by AFP)
In his final weeks as president, Joe Biden has taken decisive actions to support Ukraine. In addition to continuing the disbursement of congressionally approved aid, the White House has imposed stringent sanctions on Russia’s oil industry and targeted its “ghost fleet” of oil tankers.
These measures have already resulted in some ships being denied entry to Chinese ports, with India announcing plans to follow suit. While these sanctions are a welcome development, they echo much of Biden’s presidency: too little, too late.
It was always obvious that targeting oil exports was the best tool to keep Vladimir Putin in check. However, despite intelligence reports indicating an impending invasion of Ukraine, Biden made the foolish decision to lift sanctions on Nord Stream 2 in May 2021, further entrenching Europe’s economic and energy dependence on Russia.
According to Bob Woodward’s book, “War,” Biden’s team collectively bears responsibility for the mismanagement of the Ukraine crisis. Notably, CIA Director William Burns, a former US ambassador to Moscow, failed to take Putin’s threats seriously – despite his extensive experience, consistent intelligence warnings, and explicit statements from Putin signaling his intent to invade. Burns’ misjudgment in July 2021 exemplifies the broader failures of Biden’s administration.
Biden’s misunderstanding of the Putin regime is not surprising, given his tenure as Vice President under Barack Obama. The Obama administration infamously pursued a “reset” with the Kremlin and refrained from arming Ukraine during Russia’s initial 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Key players from that era, such as Jake Sullivan, remain influential in Biden’s administration as national security advisor.
As Anders Åslund has observed, Sullivan argued that threatening to deploy US troops in Ukraine would provoke Putin into escalating further rather than deterring him. Sullivan also opposed establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine or guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. These strategies effectively hampered Ukraine’s ability to achieve a decisive victory. Burns aligned closely with Sullivan’s cautious approach, supported by influential figures like Samuel Charap.
Charap, a close associate of Sullivan, wrote in Foreign Policy on Jan. 21, 2022 – just one month before Russia’s full-scale invasion – an essay titled “The West’s Weapons Won’t Make Any Difference to Ukraine.” Charap argued that US military aid would neither meaningfully assist Ukraine nor deter Putin. Ironically, Charap holds the position of Distinguished Chair in Russia and Eurasia Policy at the RAND Corporation, widely regarded as the Pentagon’s think tank.
As Biden prepares to leave office with some of the lowest approval ratings of any president, the question remains: does he recognize the consequences of his administration’s missteps? His recent decisions to bolster support for Ukraine suggest he may.
However, the tragedy lies in missed opportunities. Instead of decisively defeating Russia, key advisers like Sullivan, Burns, and Charap – who believed they could negotiate with Putin or broker peace – exerted too much influence over a president who lacked the resolve to act boldly.
Jason Jay Smart, Ph.D., is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. Due to his work with the democratic opposition to Pres. Vladimir Putin, Smart was persona non grata, for life, by Russia in 2010. His websites can be found at www.JasonJaySmart.com / www.AmericanPoliticalServices.com / fb.com/jasonjaysmart / Twitter: @OfficeJJSmart