Ukraine Is Now Dominating The Drone And Electronic Warfare Domains

Vikram Mittal

August 21, 2024

Forbes

 

During their initial invasion of Crimea in 2014, the Russian military skillfully integrated drones and electronic warfare into their operations. Their electronic warfare systems caused chaos on Ukrainian communication networks and pinpointed the locations of Ukrainian units. Drones would then fly in and target the Ukrainian positions. This tactic proved highly effective, prompting many militaries to adapt their technologies and strategies. At the time, Russia was the leader in military drone and electronic warfare technology, particularly those employed at the tactical level. However, over the thirty months since they launched their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has lost their edge in these technical areas.

Rather, Ukraine has emerged as a world leader in these fields as their defense industries are developing increasingly advanced systems for their warfighters. Indeed, both the Russian and Ukrainian industrial bases have been competing to innovate, develop, and deploy better technologies that can provide their soldiers with an advantage on the battlefield. This has been especially the case for drones and electronic warfare systems, as both technology domains rapidly evolved over the course of the war. In the ensuing cat-and-mouse game, Ukraine was able to outpace Russia in their development processes, allowing them to field more advanced systems faster, achieving an edge in these technical areas.

Recent Ukrainian successes in the Kursk region underscore their strengths in these technical domains. As Ukrainian forces move into an area, they reportedly have been using electronic warfare systems to disable Russian drones. They then deploy swarms of their own drones to locate and target Russian positions. These strikes are followed by ground forces who move in to secure the area. This process is repeated systematically, allowing the Ukrainians to make steady gains. Meanwhile, the Russian forces do not appear to have a response for this tactic.

Meanwhile, Russia’s capabilities in these fields have declined relative to the Ukrainians. Early in the conflict, they employed tactics similar to those used during the 2014 invasion of Crimea. They also expanded their use of loitering munitions, such as the Lancet and the Shahed drones. Additionally, Russia employed a number of electronic warfare systems, which brought down large numbers of Ukrainian drones and caused issues in Ukrainian communication. While Russian drones and electronic warfare systems are still powerful and effective, they are having less of an effect on the battlefield, as Ukraine adopted new technologies and tactics.

Ukraine’s edge over Russia in these technical areas is due to a number of reasons. A 2014 RAND study highlighted a core issue in Russia’s lengthy defense acquisition process. The long timeframe associated with developing a new system hinders their ability to incorporate advances in commercial technology. This is particularly critical in fields like drones and electronic

warfare, which should leverage cutting-edge commercial advances in autonomy, artificial intelligence, and data science.

In contrast, Ukraine, which is currently building up its defense industrial base, is ensuring strong ties between their commercial and defense sectors. Many companies that focused on commercial technology prior to the war have shifted their expertise toward developing military equipment. As a result, Ukraine now has over 200 registered companies producing military drones and 50 companies specializing in electronic warfare systems.

Even without being able to leverage their commercial sector, Russia’s defense community possesses deep expertise in these technical areas, having been pioneers in the fields. However, they have historically struggled with large-scale production. Further, much of their manufacturing capabilities are centered on foreign military sales of older systems, rather than on producing state-of-the-art equipment for their forces. Before the war, only a limited number of units were equipped with modernized systems, while the majority still relied on outdated Soviet-era equipment. While concentrating advanced gear to select units works well in maneuver-based warfare, as seen in Russia’s 2014 campaign into Crimea, this strategy is less effective in a war of attrition where Russian forces are spread across a 600-mile front.

Ukraine also benefits from a consistent flow of new systems and technologies provided by its Western allies, bolstering its development and production capabilities. In contrast, Russia’s capabilities have been constrained by trade embargoes imposed by Western countries after the invasion of Ukraine. Although Russia continues to obtain critical supplies from China, Iran, and other partners, it still faces significant shortages in many key areas.

Modern wars are won as much in labs and factories as they are on the battlefield. Over the past 30 months, Ukrainian and Russian scientists, along with their international partners, have competed to gain the upper hand in drone and electronic warfare technologies, which have proven crucial in the conflict. Although Russia initially had the advantage in these areas, they have since lost their dominance. Instead, Ukraine’s ability to rapidly innovate, produce, and deploy large quantities of new technologies has given them the upper hand, allowing them to outpace Russia in these critical domains.

 

Dr. Vikram Mittal has been a contributor to Forbes.com covering stories in aerospace and defense since 2020.  He is an associate professor at the United States Military Academy in the Department of Systems Engineering. He has taught numerous courses covering combat modeling, decision analysis, system design, vehicle dynamics, and engines. His research interests include combat simulation, model-based systems engineering, robotics, and engine knock. Previously, he was a mechanical engineer at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in the Vehicles and Robotics Group. He holds a PhD in Mechanical Engineering from MIT, an MS in Engineering Sciences from Oxford, and a BS in Aeronautics from Caltech. He is also a combat veteran and a major in the U.S. Army Reserve.