To end the war, US must let Ukraine bring the pain to the Russian homeland

By John Herbst and Adrian Karatnycky

Sept. 23, 2024

New York Post

 

As Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks Tuesday at the UN General Assembly, his country’s civilians and soldiers continue to take a pounding from Moscow’s missiles, drones and glide bombs.

Three of the five Patriot air defense systems that Ukraine was promised at the NATO summit have yet to arrive — and Russia’s recent receipt of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles means the danger for Ukraine may soon grow.

When Ukraine’s strike into Kursk Oblast gave it control over 1,200 square kilometers of Russian territory, Vladimir Putin responded by directing yet more pain against Zelensky’s civilian population.

Russian efforts have destroyed more than nine gigawatts of the Ukrainian power supply, causing massive energy shortages that could prove tragic this coming winter.

This week, Zelensky has promised to lay out a “peace plan” to end this brutal war in meetings with President Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris and in a requested meeting with former President Donald Trump — the perfect time to enact a new strategy to bring the pain of the conflict to Russia itself.

With most of the war’s devastation limited to Ukrainian soil, the Russian public has been largely insulated from the repeated attacks on critical infrastructure that Ukrainians have faced.

That is, until recently, when Ukrainian drone attacks deep within Russian territory have destroyed over 10% of Russian oil-refining capability, numerous Russian warplanes and substantial Russian arms caches.

The Harris-Biden administration continues to prohibit the use of US ATACMs on targets in Russia, and has barred Ukraine from using the UK’s Storm Shadow missiles, which have US components.

Yet the best way to turn the tide and force a just end to the war is to give Ukraine’s leaders the capacity to attack remote Russian military targets and civilian power grids, especially Moscow’s power plant, which generates over one gigawatt of heat and electricity.

Such missiles could also reach some 30 other non-nuclear power plants that feed the capital and its surrounding region.

While Ukraine has not and will not attack Russia’s civilians, the power grid serving Moscow is a legitimate target under international law.

It supports the nerve center of the Russian military and national security command, and the region includes military production facilities for Russia’s S-300, S-350, S-400, and Buk missiles.

All are central to the prosecution of the war, making their energy sources a legitimate military target. And they can be reached from Ukraine’s Sumy region by the British Storm Shadows that are reportedly now in Ukraine’s possession.

Ukraine need not perform preemptive strikes. It would be enough to permit its military to act as part of a policy of retaliation for Moscow’s attacks on Ukraine’s own heating and electricity systems, which have been continuously targeted and significantly degraded over the last two years.

Such reciprocity would allow Ukraine to deter this key component of Putin’s war effort — and create significant damage to Russia’s war machine and economy.

A major disruption at the center of Russia’s economic and bureaucratic life would be far more impactful than the sanctions that so far have had little effect on Russia’s economy.

Were legitimate targets in Moscow at play, Putin would be far less able to support his continued campaign against Ukraine and the West. It’s the best way to strengthen Ukraine’s hand and to speed the war’s end.

With the US election soon to bring a new foreign-policy team to Washington, Zelensky is right to make the strong case for a new strategy of war that gives Ukraine the right to respond to Russia in kind.

Anything short of that makes it easier for Putin to continue a war of attrition that will result in hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian casualties and immense ultimate financial cost to the West.

 

John Herbst, former ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan, is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where Adrian Karatnycky is a senior fellow.