Taras Kuzio
March 10, 2025
EU Reporter
The Donald Trump administration is seeking a new era of Russian-US relations without recognising Russia is a declining great power, a process which has been taking place since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and has accelerated since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. By not recognizing this strategic reality, the Trump administration is giving succour to Kremlin myths Russia should be recognised as the equal of the US, in a similar manner as they believe was the Soviet Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin has, after all, described the USSR as ‘Historic Russia’, writes Taras Kuzio.
In the vote at the UN on the third anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine only one country in Eurasia supported Russia, and that was Belarus. Russia has lost influence in Central Asia to Türkiye and China, to the West and Türkiye in the South Caucasus and to Türkiye in Syria. Meanwhile, three years of war in Ukraine has shown Russia does not have the second-best army in the world; if anything, it is the second best in Ukraine and, being unable to eject Ukrainians from Kursk, maybe even the second best in Russia.
Why then does US President Donald Trump treat Russia as if it was the powerful USSR, as it obviously isn’t. As Senator John McCain once remarked: “Russia is a gas station masquerading as a country.” Russia, when compared to China which exports electric cars, mobile phones and other technologies, does not export manufactured goods.
But even in this field, Russia is in decline after losing its biggest energy market – Europe and billions of dollars on investments into two Nord Stream gas pipelines that would have brought Russian gas to Germany and tied Europe to Russia’s hip for decades. Russia main remaining export market is to sell discounted oil to China and India.
Russia’s second big export was arms exports but, guess what, their obvious poor quality in the war in Ukraine is turning away long-standing importers such as India. Russia’s supposedly faster and better missiles than anything the West supposedly possesses were brought down by Ukrainians. Nearly four decades old Us patriot systems have brought down numerous Russian kinzhal missiles while Ukrainian air defence brought down Russia’s oreshnik missile.
Russia has forever lost Ukraine, irrespective of any ceasefire agreement that leaves a fifth of its territory under Russian occupation. Anti-Russian sentiment is widespread in the country – including in the traditionally pro-Russian eastern regions of Ukraine. EU members are pushing to speed up Ukraine’s membership date. While NATO membership is not currently on the cards, one popular proposal is to include in planned security guarantees the option of bringing Ukraine into NATO if Russia launches a third invasion after a ceasefire agreement is reached. Moldova, which has never expressed an interest in joining NATO, is also on track to join the EU.
Russian influence is in terminal decline in Central Asia. The Kremlin has neither the funds nor the ideology to maintain its grip on five Central Asian states. Russia has become China’s younger brother and is outmatched financially by Beijing in Central Asia. Central Asian states, who are highly sensitive to their territorial integrity, particularly Kazakhstan, have in turn been turning away from Russia over its support for separatism and annexation in Ukraine. Meanwhile, China is competing with Türkiye’s promotion of pan-Turkism among four of the five Central Asian states who are Turkic speaking.
In the South Caucasus, Russia’s influence is all but gone. Armenia is moving West, Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia have collapsed, while it’s only a matter of time before protestors in Georgia overthrow the pro-Russian regime.
In the 2000s, Georgia was the most anti-Russian country in the former Soviet Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin loathed his Georgian counterpart, Mikhail Saaskashvili and arguably one goal of Russia’s 2008 invasion was to undertake regime change. This goal was not undertaken and instead the Kremlin sent oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who had amassed a fortune in the 1990s in Russia, to capture Georgia on Russia’s behalf and imprison Saakashvili as a thank you to his Kremlin puppet master. Since the 2012 elections, Georgia Dream, who are clearly unpopular, have used election fraud to stay in power.
A pro-Russian regime in Georgia is ironic because it is the only country in the South Caucasus to have Russian-occupied territory. After the 2008 Russian invasion, the Kremlin recognised the ‘independence’ of the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and since then they have remained outside of the Georgian central government’s control.
Although Armenia is integrated into Russian-led structures it is taking steps to do its own ‘Armexit’ from the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and Eurasian Economic Union. Russia’s two military bases in Armenia will be closed after the conclusion of a peace agreement with neighbouring Azerbaijan, which is why the Kremlin is so eagerly seeking to prevent its signing. Russia withdrew in 2012 from the Soviet era Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan.
Pro-Western Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan became angry at what he believed to be Russia’s betrayal of Armenia during the 2020 Second Karabakh War and the 2023 short war over Karabakh. Pashinyan condemned the CSTO for not intervening in the First Karabakh War while criticised Russian peacekeepers for remaining passive and not protecting Karabakh.
Armenia is catching up with Azerbaijan and Georgia who withdrew from the CSTO in 1999. Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO and Russian border guards and Russian peacekeepers have been withdrawn. Pashinyan is supporting Armenian membership of the EU which would require Armexit from the Eurasian Economic Union as no country can be in two customs unions.
Russia has built a military alliance with Iran with whom it signed a strategic partnership in January. Iranian-Azerbaijan relations have been cold since the January 2023 attack on the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tehran. Persian nationalists have traditionally viewed Azerbaijan as a
lost portion of its empire. Additionally, Iran has repeatedly condemned Azerbaijan’s two-decade long military cooperation with Israel.
Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia rapidly deteriorated following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane which was shot out of the sky by Russian air defence and led to the deaths of 28 civilians and crew. Azerbaijan is taking legal action against Russia in an international court using evidence that Russian was responsible for the crash.
In July 2014, a surface to air missile launched by a Russian BUK system downed Malaysian airlines MH17 killing 298 passengers and crew. Russia has never admitted to its responsibility and instead spread disinformation blaming Ukrainians, the CIA and others. Three Russians were found guilty by a district court in The Hague in the Netherlands and sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused Russia of covering up Russia’s responsibility, stating the Kremlin’s response was ‘surprising, regrettable, and infuriating.’ Although Putin apologized to Aliyev in late December 2024 that the crash occurred in Russian airspace, he did not admit Russia caused the crash and did not agree to launch criminal proceedings against those responsible.
The clash comes at the same time as Azerbaijan has tried and convicted Armenian-Russian oligarch Ruben Vardanyan for promoting separatism. Vardanyan was parachuted by the Kremlin into the Karabakh separatist enclave and became State Minister in November 2022-February 2023. His goals were twofold: firstly, protect Karabakh’s Armenian separatist enclave as the last bit of Azerbaijani territory controlled by Armenia and secondly, take power from pro-Western Prime Minister Pashinyan and return Armenia to Russia’s sphere of influence. The imprisonment of Putin’s man in Armenia – Vardanyan – was a direct slap in the face for the Kremlin in a similar manner to Ukraine’s imprisonment of Viktor Medvedchuk.
Citing national security concerns and external interference in its internal affairs, Azerbaijan has closed the local branch of Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation). The Russian House in Baku where Rossotrudnichestvo was located was taken by the local authorities.
Officially Rossotrudnichestvo promotes Russian culture and language, supports the Russian diaspora, and preserves Soviet historical sites abroad. Unofficially, Rossotrudnichestvo is used by the Russian intelligence services to intervene in the domestic affairs of the countries where it has offices. Ukraine closed Rossotrudnichestvo in 2014, accusing it of being a cover for Russian intelligence services to promote subversion and spread Kremlin disinformation. A Russian intelligence network operated within Azerbaijan from Rossotrudnichestvo which included former high-ranking officials and ministers and was overseen by a “Russian intelligence operative based in Moscow, who made regular visits to Azerbaijan”. Azerbaijan banned Russian
State Duma deputy and former world heavyweight boxing champion Nikolai Valuev from entering following his unsubstantiated claims that Azerbaijan’s diaspora groups are involved in criminal activities in Russia.
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has moved away from Russia’s orbit in three ways.
The first is through its membership of the Non-Aligned Movement.
The second is through the Organisation of Turkic States, with Türkiye signing a strategic partnership in 2020. “Baku has made it clear that Azerbaijan is part of the Turkic family and emphasises the importance of a new Turkic centre of power.”
Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s military partnership is not surprisingly viewed by Russia with suspicion. Turkish and Israeli military equipment used by Azerbaijan proved to be far superior to Russian used by Armenia during the Second Karabakh War in 2020, leading to the latter’s defeat.
Türkiye facilitated the removal of the pro-Russian Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria which was a strategic defeat for Russia. The Kremlin lost naval bases that had been negotiated by the Soviet Union with his father, Hafez al-Assad after he taken power in a 1971 coup. The fall of Assad was also a major strategic defeat for Iran which lost its main base of support for its proxy groups in the Greater Middle East.
The third is by becoming a key energy supplier to Europe alongside Norway, and possibly the US, to replace Russia whose supplies have been increasingly phased out since 2022. Even after a ceasefire, which may be negotiated this year, it is unlikely European states will return to importing Russian energy and thus Azerbaijani (and Norwegian) oil and gas, and US LNG, will continue to be in demand.
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago it has lost its sphere of influence in Eurasia. Russia can only count on Belarus to give it support at the United Nations and other international organisations. Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia are moving West, soon to be joined by Georgia, Central Asia is moving east while Azerbaijanis is aligned with the Turkic World and Israel.
US President Trump should recognise Russia is a declining power and Putin can never be a trustworthy partner. Putin’s entry in future Russian history books will be written as having followed the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in bringing about a second disintegration, this time of Russia.
Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, co-author of The Four Roots of Russia’s War Against Ukraine and co-editor of Russia and Modern Fascism: New Perspectives on the Kremlin’s War Against Ukraine.