Why Washington Must Redefine Its Objectives
By Richard Haass
November 4, 2024
Foreign Affairs
Well into the September 10 debate between the U.S. presidential candidates, ABC News anchor David Muir posed a question to Republican nominee Donald Trump: “Do you want Ukraine to win this war?”
Trump refused to answer directly. “I want the war to stop,” he said. When Muir repeated the question, Trump again evaded: “I think it’s in the U.S. best interest to get this war finished and just get it done.”
Many observers were critical of Trump’s refusal to espouse support for Ukraine in its war against Russian aggression. Yet the former president is hardly the only person refusing to directly answer such a query. Most American national security experts, including U.S. President Joe Biden’s foreign policy team, have said they want Ukraine to defeat Russia. But they have refused to define what, exactly, that means, often saying it is for Ukraine to decide.
If pressed, most would indeed probably define winning in a way similar to how Kyiv defines it, including in its most recent “victory plan”: ousting Russian troops from the entirety of Ukraine’s territory, Crimea included, and reestablishing control over its 1991 borders. There is good reason for adopting this definition. The most basic, if not always honored, norm of international order—one that has endured for some 400 years—is that borders are to be respected. Territory is not to be acquired through the threat or use of armed force. This was one of the main reasons why the United States and other countries rallied to defend South Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990.
Yet although this definition is desirable, it is ultimately unworkable. In principle, Ukraine could liberate its lost territory if the United States and its European partners intervened with forces of their own. But this would require jettisoning the indirect strategy they chose in 2022. It would come at great human, military, and economic cost. And it would introduce far greater risk, as it would mean war between NATO and nuclear-armed Russia. For this reason, such a policy will not be adopted.
Instead of clinging to an infeasible definition of victory, Washington must grapple with the grim reality of the war and come to terms with a more plausible outcome. It should still define victory as Kyiv remaining sovereign and independent, free to join whatever alliances and associations it wants. But it should jettison the idea that, to win, Kyiv needs to liberate all its land. So as the United States and its allies continue to arm Ukraine, they must take the uncomfortable step of pushing Kyiv to negotiate with the Kremlin—and laying out a clear sense of how it should do so.
Such a pivot may be unpopular. It will take political courage to make, and it will require care to implement. But it is the only way to end the hostilities, preserve Ukraine as a truly independent country, enable it to rebuild, and avoid a dire outcome for both Ukraine and the world.
WHAT IS AND WHAT WILL NEVER BE
For Kyiv, a return to 1991 borders is militarily unachievable. The disparity between the manpower and equipment of Russia and Ukraine is simply too great. History suggests that to expel Russia from Crimea or the Donbas, Ukraine would need forces some three times more numerous and capable than Moscow’s, and Russia has a population at least three times larger and a much bigger industrial base. Russian defensive positions are well fortified, and it has received arms and technical assistance from China, Iran, and North Korea. There is no reason to assume it will not receive more such help over time. In October, after all, North Korea deepened its involvement by deploying thousands of its troops to Russia for use in the war effort.
Kyiv, meanwhile, needs most of its forces just to defend the approximately 80 percent of Ukrainian territory it still controls. It especially needs them right now: in recent weeks, Russian forces have gained control of additional territory in the east. Ukraine is trying to build up a more formidable arsenal, but it lacks much in the way of defense manufacturing capability. Its Western partners are helping, but they lack the ability to produce enough arms and ammunition to give Kyiv all it wants while meeting their other commitments. The United States needs enough arms to help not just Ukraine but also partners such as Israel and Taiwan (as well as to provide for itself). Washington could and arguably should provide Kyiv with more sophisticated systems and loosen the constraints on U.S. provisions for their use. But there is no game-changing weapon or lifted restriction that would allow Ukraine to simultaneously defend what it already controls and liberate what it does not.
Many analysts refuse to publicly acknowledge these realities, in part out of fear that doing so would embolden Russia and demoralize Ukraine. But articulating an impossible definition of winning creates its own political problems.
Doing so has, for example, handed American and European opponents—or, more generously, skeptics—of providing Ukraine with additional military aid a powerful argument. The West, they say, is spending tens of billions of dollars on a policy that has little or no chance of succeeding while threatening to reduce its readiness in other theaters, where some analysts say greater U.S. interests are at stake.“Fundamentally, we lack the capacity to manufacture the amount of weapons Ukraine needs us to supply to win the war,” wrote Republican vice presidential nominee JD Vance, in April. “These weapons,” he continued, “are not only needed by Ukraine.”
By not offering a realistic definition of victory, the West is also reducing the pressure on Russia by leaving little room for serious diplomacy. Each protagonist is left free to pursue its maximalist aims. This is not to suggest Russia and Ukraine are morally equivalent; they are not. But without a real Western diplomatic effort, Russian President Vladimir Putin can argue that his regime is not the principal obstacle to ending the war, citing the United States’ and Europe’s refusals to negotiate. The result is less international and internal pressure on the Kremlin. Western sanctions
against Russia are widely ignored, and Putin is increasingly welcome at major international forums—including, for example, the October BRICS summit.
The continuation of the war, meanwhile, is devastating Ukraine. The country has suffered over 300,000 casualties, a staggering number—even if only half of Russia’s losses. The Ukrainian economy is expected to grow by only three percent this year after having contracted by some 30 percent in 2022. Continued conflict makes it impossible for the country to begin serious rebuilding, as few will want to invest in structures that could again be reduced to rubble. It also increases the ultimate cost of rebuilding, which has already reached an estimated $500 billion. And the endless fighting is immiserating Ukrainian citizens, who now suffer from regular shortages of electricity caused by Russian attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure and the open-ended military service required of many Ukrainian men. It is thus no surprise that Ukrainians are increasingly leaving their state. Roughly six million of them now live elsewhere, a number that includes many military-age men.
In short, Ukraine and its supporters find themselves pursuing a policy that is unlikely to succeed but sure to be costly. Time will not make things better. Fatigue is setting in, both inside Ukraine and among its backers. The war’s trajectory is neither desirable nor sustainable.
Ukrainians are aware of these facts. It is why, in October, President Volodymyr Zelensky released his “victory plan.” But despite the accompanying fanfare, Zelensky’s proposal provides little guidance on how Ukraine can overcome the many challenges the country faces. The plan lists the security guarantees and economic support Ukraine wants, but not the outcome it desires. It calls for the “madmen in the Kremlin to lose the ability to continue the war,” but it fails to define any diplomatic objectives other than that “Russia must permanently lose control over Ukraine and even the desire for such control.” It offers, in other words, no realistic strategy that Ukraine’s partners can support. It is not a plan for victory, but a prescription for continued war. If Kyiv’s allies walk away, it could end up being a prescription for defeat.
THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE
The prospect of Ukraine losing—or ceasing to be a truly independent country, out from under Russia’s sway—would constitute a serious blow to international order and to European security. It would increase the risk from Russia to other parts of Europe, weaken the confidence of the West, and signal to China (and possibly North Korea) that the West may not have the ability and resolve needed to defeat aggression. It would weaken the norm against conquest. And it would, of course, be terrible for the Ukrainian people.
There is, however, an alternative strategy to both indefinite war and Kyiv’s defeat. It involves continued Western support for Ukraine and opposition to Russia. But it also requires straight talk with Ukraine’s leadership along with limited incentives for Moscow.
At the core of such a revamped strategy is a more modest definition of winning—but one that still protects fundamental Western and Ukrainian interests while denying Putin many of his war aims. The objective should be keeping Ukraine an independent, sovereign, and economically viable country. It must be free to choose its political system and leadership. The country must
also be free to rearm and maintain a military of whatever size it wants, to join the European Union, and to accept security commitments from outsiders. It needs to have economic access to the Black Sea.
Kyiv does not require 100 percent of its territory to realize these goals. But what, then, does it need? An end to the war, above all. That end does not mandate a permanent settlement that addresses all the issues separating Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, it should not at this juncture, as any overly ambitious diplomatic undertaking would surely fail. Instead, what the country needs now is an interim cessation of hostilities that largely reflects current realities on the ground.
To bring this about, the United States and its partners in Europe should initiate a dialogue with Ukraine. The goal would be to persuade its leaders to accept this more modest definition of winning. They should tell Kyiv that Western support cannot be expected to continue at or near current levels without it. But they should also make an ironclad pledge to do everything in their power to provide Ukraine with arms for the long haul. The bulk of these arms would be made available on the condition that they be used for defensive purposes, but certain longer-range systems could be used by Ukraine against military and economic targets in Russia. The aim would be to signal to Moscow that it will not prevail on the battlefield now or in the future and that it will pay a high price for trying. Additional carrots for Ukraine are most likely to be found in the economic realm.
Diplomacy would take place in two phases. The first phase would seek to bring about a cease-fire, either along current battle lines or with limited adjustments, with a buffer zone separating the two protagonists. It would end the bloodshed and allow Ukraine to rebuild. It would not require the country to give up or compromise on any of its legal or political claims when it comes to borders. There could be some sort of international presence to monitor the agreement. It might be modeled in some ways on the cease-fire that has maintained peace in Cyprus for 50 years.
A second phase of diplomacy would start as soon as the first phase is done. This second phase would be much more prolonged—perhaps lasting decades, until Russia has a post-Putin leadership interested in reintegrating the country into the West. It would address additional arrangements, including what are often termed final-status issues. This phase could involve territorial transfers in both directions and a degree of autonomy for the inhabitants of Crimea and Ukraine’s east. It would also involve the creation of a security guarantee for Ukraine, even though the history of such guarantees is mixed. (The discredited 1994 Budapest Memorandum clearly did not offer real protection.) Ideally, this guarantee would involve NATO membership for Kyiv. But a coalition of the willing, including the United States, could offer Ukraine a security pledge if NATO members prove reluctant to admit Ukraine.
Critics of diplomacy argue that Russia will not abide by any agreement it signs and that it will instead use a cease-fire as a chance to regroup before continuing its offensive. This is, of course, possible. But a credible long-term commitment by the West to provide military help to Ukraine, along with fewer restrictions on how Ukraine could use long-range systems, would increase the cost of the war to Russia and challenge Putin’s assumption that he can outlast the West. At the
same time, there is something in this proposal for Putin that might prompt him to respect its terms. It would not require Russia to give up claims to Ukraine. Moscow could continue to rearm. It would keep, for now, most or all of the Ukrainian territory it controls. The West might even agree to lift some sanctions on the Russian economy, and should Russia respect the cease-fire, lift more later—although important sanctions would remain in place to provide leverage for diplomacy’s second phase. As part of that second phase, the West might ask Ukraine to forswear nuclear weapons. NATO, while admitting Ukraine, could pledge not to station its forces on Ukraine’s territory.
If accepted, the first phase of this diplomatic initiative would help preserve Ukraine’s independence and allow it to start rebuilding. But even if rejected, the initiative should make it less difficult to galvanize continued military and economic support for Ukraine. It would highlight that it really is Putin’s ambitions, not Zelensky’s, that stand in the way of an end to the fighting. Either way, Ukraine would be better off than it is now.
To some, what is described here may not sound like winning. It is arguably neither fair nor just. It does not promise peace. But it would be incomparably better than the alternative of Ukraine losing the war or fighting endlessly. This approach would deny Putin much of what he seeks, which is to bring most or all of Ukraine back under Moscow’s thumb. Foreign policy must be doable as well as desirable. The comparison analysts should make is not between what exists and the ideal, but between the possible and the alternative.
FIGHTING CHANCE
As of this writing, there are approximately 75 days remaining in Biden’s presidency. Biden should use that time to do all he can to increase the odds that the United States adopts this new strategy for Ukraine, one that is accepted by both U.S. allies and Kyiv.
He should do so no matter who wins on November 5. A president-elect Kamala Harris would benefit from Biden having taken the difficult but necessary step of revoking Ukraine’s veto over Washington’s war aims. It would be better for her if he is the one who stops insisting on goals that cannot be met. Biden would take the heat, giving Harris space to carry out what would be a controversial but necessary strategy change.
Biden would also be wise to embrace a diplomatic settlement following a Donald Trump victory. Trump, after all, is on record advocating for one himself. But by outlining a new strategy for Ukraine, one predicated on advancing a reasonable diplomatic proposal coupled with the promise of long-term military support, Biden could help set the bar for U.S. policy in a manner that would help protect Kyiv’s core interests from an individual less inclined to back Ukraine against Russia. And hopefully, Trump would ultimately see that continuing to support Ukraine while pushing for diplomacy is actually necessary to ending the conflict. The alternative—selling out Ukraine—would be rejected by Kyiv, resulting in a one-sided but open-ended war between it and Russia. A rejection by Trump of this approach or something like it would pin the moral and political responsibility for a Russian victory and Ukraine’s defeat on his administration and the United States.
The 47th U.S. president, of course, will ultimately enjoy considerable discretion. No policy can be entirely locked in by a predecessor. But assisting Ukraine in repelling Russian aggression has arguably been Biden’s greatest foreign policy accomplishment. In the time he has left, he should do whatever he can to protect it. And adopting a new, more sustainable strategy for Kyiv is the best way to do so—and to therefore ensure Ukraine continues to exist as a thriving, sovereign, independent nation.
RICHARD HAASS is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Counselor at Centerview Partners, and Distinguished University Scholar at New York University.