Mykhailo Hlukhovs’kyi
January 18, 2025
Hlavkom
“We are paying an extremely high price for caution on the part of the US”. Ukraine has 11 years of war against Russia behind it. Despite the power of the aggressor, thanks to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and everyone who helps them, Ukraine continues to defend itself and maintain its statehood. However, now the world is on the verge of great changes. Ukraine’s main ally in the bloody war with the aggressor – the USA – is experiencing a change of power.
Republicans have won a majority in both houses of Congress, and Donald Trump is returning to the White House on January 20. Until now, Ukraine in the war against Russia has had the absolute support of a coalition of civilized states led by the United States. They acted on the basis of protecting democratic values, and the leaders of the allied states have constantly emphasized their importance.
What will the controversial and unpredictable Trump change? There is a well-founded anxiety about this in Ukraine. What should Ukrainians and our other allies prepare for?
The answers, at least some of them, can be found if we consider current events in a historical context, drawing on the experience of politicians and diplomats in the past. Another attempt to do this was made by ” Hlavkom ” together with Harvard University historian Serhiy Plokhiy.
“Trump is taking this story to the point of freezing it at least”
10 years of war against Russia, almost three years of full-scale invasion. What are we all closer to now, a halt, a freeze, victory or defeat in this great, albeit local war for the world? Is everything moving towards World War III?
How it looked from the American point of view. The task for them was to avoid a global war.
Because of this, embassies were evacuated from Kyiv so that any arrival would not become a trigger, a reason for the US and its allies to join the war. I think that the US achieved this goal that it set for itself at a great cost to Ukraine.
What Trump is saying now is actually a continuation of the same policy that was, only in more radical ways. We must bear in mind that Trump can be unpredictable. I am 90% sure that we are not on the verge of a world war, not on the verge of a bigger war than the one we have now. We are paying an extremely high price for caution on the part of the US. We are talking about not supplying weapons when necessary and on the scale in which they are necessary. In my opinion, Trump is leading this story at least to a freeze in the armed conflict.
The Biden administration has consistently said that it will “support Ukraine as long as necessary .” However, now neither Trump nor senior officials of his future administration are promising this. The current period of US history resembles the time of President Roosevelt, when the US refused to enter the war for a long time. And only after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor did they
change this position. What should be the new trigger for the US to take off its rose-colored glasses and understand that this is a war for the values that their state has always represented?
Every parallel has its limitations. And here the limitation is that it was President Roosevelt who understood the importance of the war in Europe for the United States and pushed Congress and he American public, so to speak, to enter this war. There is a theory that he actually provoked Pearl Harbor by cutting off oil supplies from Japan. Biden understood the importance of this war for America, but was extremely cautious. And now we have the next president, who has a completely different position from that of Roosevelt. That is, for him, America comes first, and European problems are the problems of Europeans. Trump reflects public sentiment in America itself. This is the so-called isolationism.
What could be the new Pearl Harbor, if we draw parallels? The most obvious option from recent US history is September 11, 2001, an attack on American territory. But there are other triggers. One of these triggers is Russia’s readiness to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. That is, this is an absolute collapse of the world order and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in which both the US and China see their interest.
In the fall of 2022, the Americans made threats ( to the Russian Federation, so that it would not resort to the use of nuclear weapons ). The Americans believe that China also sent appropriate messages to Russia. I speak as a historian, looking at some historical precedents or drawing historical parallels. History can explain and help understand a lot, but it does not foresee everything. There may be unforeseen things, but one way or another, this must be some extremely serious threat to the core interests of the United States… It seems that Western countries, in particular the United States, are still afraid of Russia, which is why they are not showing determination?
There is determination in the commitments that the US has made. This is regarding the defense of NATO countries, or Taiwan, or Israel. Because failure to fulfill its commitments will be a serious threat to the world as a whole. And Ukraine is precisely the part of the world for which there were no such obligations… What is NATO? These are guarantees. There is opposition from the US, which does not give such guarantees to Ukraine. So a very clear line of demarcation has been drawn between NATO, or countries such as Taiwan, Israel, and countries that were, so to speak, in a gray zone. This is the context where America shows either determination or caution. And this so-called gray zone, where Ukraine is, is the most dangerous place to be. This is the creation of initiatives for the aggressor country, in order to eliminate this gray zone in its favor.
And this is, in fact, what Putin tried and is trying to do. This is what part of Ukrainian diplomacy and statesmen envisaged back in the 90s of the last century, when NATO expansion began and the end came to Ukrainian plans or illusions that it was possible to create some kind of Central European bloc with Poland, with Hungary, and have a common defense with them. Because it as clear that due to the mood of the population, in particular, Ukraine would not join NATO. Partly this is due to warnings from the USA. But mainly due to the fact that the Ukrainian voter was absolutely not ready for such steps.
“Poland is becoming an extremely important factor in the Western bloc of the EU”
In an interview with Hlavkom, your colleague, historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, said that there is a danger that the West, although it will not refuse to support Ukraine, will support it only at a level that Ukraine will not lose. That is, by doing so, they will condemn our state to slow agony.
Do you share this point of view? How to prevent agony?
Speaking of this from a historical perspective, we have experience supporting, say, the same Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Although this was indirect support from the US. We have experience supporting the opposition in Eastern Europe, including Solidarity in Poland. But in general, there was no direct intervention, because there was an understanding that this was more or less the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union.
Since the days of Solidarity, the weight of the United States in the Western bloc has changed. And now, especially after Trump says, “America First.” And the role of European players has increased, in particular Poland, which was not part of the Western world. And now, in the absence of leadership, either from Germany or from France due to internal problems, Poland is becoming an extremely important factor in the Western bloc of the EU.
And there is talk that the Dnipro is a red line for Poland. To a certain extent, there was and will be pressure on some of the Western allies to enter the war if there is a threat of the Russians crossing the Dnipro. For some of the Polish establishment, the danger of the Russians crossing the Dnipro is a red line. For the rest of the allies, of course, it may or may not be a red line. But Poland is currently a very influential member of the West. America’s position was formulated before 2022, when the US thought that Russia would not interfere, because there would be sanctions and there would be support for the Russian resistance.
We looked at this story from a historical perspective, we looked at the history of the UPA with the understanding that there would be resistance ( resistance in Ukraine in the event of major Russian aggression ), that America would support this resistance in the same way as it supported the Mujahideen. So, I think, this position of America has not changed much. But there is the position of Europe, which is changing, and there is the position of Poland. There can really be very different options here.
During a recent press conference, Trump unequivocally admitted that Ukraine was and is a zone of Russian interests, so it should not have been said that Ukraine has the right to NATO membership. He means Biden. But this simply seems like an unwillingness to look at the real cause-and-effect relationship of Russia’s war, where Ukraine’s desire to join NATO is just an excuse. Not seeing the reality that Russia simply wants to destroy Ukraine is fear of Russia, or simply a lack of understanding of how to act in this situation, when it is necessary to recognize Russia as a terrorist?
Fear of Russia is a suitable explanation for this policy (on the part of the USA). From the point of view of the history of international relations, it has a slightly different formulation. That is, it is about the fact that there are great powers that have their own interests, including territorial ones. That is, this is Real politic. A threat to these interests automatically causes a reaction from another great power. The world has changed a lot since the 19th or 20th centuries. But one
thing has remained the same since the Cold War. There are still two nuclear superpowers in the world. One of them is Russia. And the contingency is that once the USSR, and then Russia, was an economic superpower. But today it is not even in the top ten economies, but it remains a nuclear superpower. And this is probably schizophrenia, which is destabilizing the world order.
That is, this is Mearsheimer’s game, traditional Realpolitik( John Mearsheimer is an American political scientist, author of the theory of Offensive Realism and a study of the influence of the Israeli lobby in the United States on the country’s foreign policy ). And in this sense, Russia is in of the Club of Great Powers, where other great powers should respect its interests. That is, it is about the fact that the United States was ready to go to war when Soviet, or, more precisely, Ukrainian missiles appeared in Cuba , that is, there was a threat of potential intervention by the presence of the USSR in Latin America. It is about the world of great powers and their logic, which is not our logic. And which is unacceptable to us. But the question is that this logic is not acceptable to most countries in the world.
Is the rhetoric of newly elected US President Donald Trump regarding territorial claims to Denmark, threats to Panama, and calls for Canada to become the 51st state just jokes, an outrage, an attempt to divert Americans from domestic problems to external ones, or is it a real danger for Denmark, Canada, and Panama? Does American society tolerate such expansionist rhetoric? How can we understand this logic of Trump?
On the one hand, this is clearly imperial rhetoric. If the US makes such claims through the mouths of its past and future presidents, then this effectively legitimizes Putin’s corresponding claims as well. Putin and Trump’s values are the same. Accordingly, if the US has claims to some foreign territories, then some other country may also have claims to someone else’s sovereign territories. This is the logic of Real politic that I was talking about.
Now regarding the actions that this logic can provoke. What happened is a public statement not only about the US interest in Greenland and the Panama Canal, it is actually a claim to exclusive control over them. This is a geopolitical confrontation against Russia and China. That is, Greenland is also the future of the North of the world in the conditions of global warming, the opening of new routes. This is access to minerals. The key for the US is control over the Panama Canal, which is administered by a company from Hong Kong. That is, Trump is marking parts of the world where he sees a core interest of the United States.
Does this mean that there will be a landing of some troops there today? Not at all. Does this mean that the Americans will support this landing? Not at all. It means the beginning of some conversations about this. And then suddenly America doesn’t take Greenland, but creates some additional military base there, for example. Or an American company replaces a company from Hong Kong in the administration of the canal. That’s probably a realistic goal. But it all starts with raising the stakes. That’s what I see in Trump’s statements. We are in a more turbulent world today than during the Cold War. If we’re not talking about a world war, how likely is it that conflicts in the Middle East, between Azerbaijan and Armenia, will become more heated, or that China will dare to attack Taiwan?
Are there any tendencies for escalation?
Of course. Now this is a transitional stage, in fact the end of a certain stability that existed since the end of World War II. That is, first a bipolar world formed in the late 40s and early 50s. And then the USSR collapsed and there was only one policeman in the world – the USA. After the operation in Iraq, it became clear that this policeman actually does not have enough resources to control the whole world. And he, so to speak, is stepping back, determining what is main and what is secondary for him. And in this understanding there is a trend that began with Obama, that Europe is European affairs. That is, the USA should not be too involved in all these things. They say, we should take care of ourselves first.
This reformatting is taking place in the conditions when China is rising. And Russia has actually tried to take advantage of this situation as well. Putin’s statements, his Munich speech in 2007 took place in the conditions of the US defeat in the war in Iraq. For Russia, this attempt, which it is trying to take advantage of the war with Ukraine, will not end well in the future. Indeed, we are now in a more turbulent world than during the Cold War.
What will replace the shattered system that emerged after World War II and guaranteed relative stability for decades? What rules will apply?
Instability comes in place of stability, and large countries or blocs come in that control security in their understanding of their own region. And this question is a challenge for Europe. Can it turn into a bloc not only economic, but also security? Trump constantly says this: if you want us to protect you, you have to pay for your own security. Europe is a very complex mechanism. If it does not transform itself in terms of how these security issues will be resolved, it will have constant problems with some countries like Hungary, which can block security things…
China did not want this war to start. For it, it is instability, which has a bad effect on its economic condition. But as a country that is developing economically the most dynamically, it wins even in a bad situation. That is, for it, Russian energy resources are cheaper, Russia is much more in China’s zone of influence than before, due to the fact that markets in the West are closed to Russia, sanctions are in force.
I would like to return to the issue of Poland. You said that Poland actually has the leadership and for it the red line for entering the war is the threat from the Russians to cross the Dnipro. Who among our partners also has similar red lines? Where will the allies’ fear of nuclear weapons go if the Dnipro is crossed?
The greatest fear of a nuclear threat is not Polish history, it is American history. For Poland and the Baltic states, the greatest threat is a Russian invasion. That is, there is a big difference between the US and Poland in terms of the priority of threats. If we are talking about, say, the involvement of Western armies in the Russian-Ukrainian war, I do not think that we are talking about NATO, we are talking about what the Americans called the Coalition of the willing ( the term used for the Multinational Forces in Iraq led by the US ). That is, it could be the Baltic states, Poland, or some other partners. Macron once said this about France.
As for Poland’s role, it is growing with the support of the Baltic states in a situation where traditional leaders in Europe, such as Germany, France, and Britain, are not performing their
leadership functions. Britain has effectively left the EU. Germany may reappear on the scene, but it will have to digest Merkel’s legacy. France is in a very unstable situation, although it traditionally wants to play the role of the leader of Europe. That is, in these conditions, unless Germany, after the elections, somehow very sharply declares its leadership ambitions.
Poland is a country that knows where its interests lie. Poland can build a common front with the United States on the basis of, conditionally, the “Trump formula”, according to which EU countries should sharply increase defense spending.
After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there was a surge of interest in studying the Ukrainian language, culture, and history, particularly in America. And history separate from Russian. What is the current trend of this interest?
Over the past two years, there has been a surge of introspection and criticism. There has been a wave of decolonialism towards Russian history, Russian culture, especially in 2023. Now this surge is going down, although not to the level at which the situation was before the full-scale invasion. That is, a correction has taken place. In 2024, several new positions for teachers of Ukrainian language, literature, and Ukrainian culture were created in the United States. In particular, in the Department of Political Science at the Kennedy School ( John F. Kennedy School of Government ). Yes, these are small changes. But compared to what was before, they are revolutionary.
The last few years have been shaping a new generation of graduate students who will come along that will be the defining factor in 10-15 years. For them, the intellectual atmosphere they are growing up in is completely different from what has been the case since the collapse of the USSR or the Gorbachev takeover. Ukraine is on the map. It is an object of research not only for political scientists, but also for others. I see positive changes here. For historians, I also see threats related to the fact that in war conditions it is impossible to go to Ukraine and work in archives.
Serhii Mykolayovych Plokhy is a historian and author. He is the Mykhailo Hrushevsky professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University