David Hambling
November 8, 2024
Forbes
‘Saint Javelin,’ a cartoon Madonna cradling an American missile launcher, has become a popular Ukrainian meme. The Javelin anti-tank missile is a powerful symbol of U.S. aid, and the war has cemented its reputation as a wonder weapon. But this is not the whole story. The actual kill rate appears far lower than this reputation suggests.
The real effectiveness of such missiles is important for several reasons. The most immediate is restocking: the conflict in Ukraine has taken up almost half of existing U.S. stocks, suggesting that America needs a lot more missiles. The other question is how well these extremely expensive munitions — $200,348 per missile in the current budget — stack up against modern weapons.
Guided Missiles: Saints and War Heroes
There is no doubt that the FGM-148 Javelin Weapon System has been one of the stars of the conflict, along with the NLAW from the U.K. and Ukraine’s own Stugna-P missile. Javelin has proved well capable of destroying any Russian tank in existence. Although security considerations mean there are more videos of Javelins being fired than of the effect downrange, there are enough to demonstrate how devastating it is.
This does not mean that smart, precision-guided missiles provide the one-shot-one-kill capability as intended. That has always been the idea. In the 1980s, NATO was faced by a Soviet army with a vast numerical superiority in armored vehicles. These are, incidentally, exactly the same vehicles now being taken out of storage and sent into Ukraine. Western tanks were individually superior, but costly. There was never any question of matching Russian numbers.
New microprocessor technology promised a solution. Rather than fighting the Russians with massed tanks and artillery, Western forces could defeat them with compact precision-guided weapons which unerringly hit the target. A small stockpile of guided missiles would suffice to wipe out an entire invasion force.
The Javelin, fielded by the U.S. Army in 1996, is the apex of these developments. Small enough to be carried by one soldier but able to knock out armor more than two miles away, Javelin is a ‘fire and forget’ missile, so-called because, unlike previous generations, it guides itself automatically once locked on to a target.
Makers Lockheed Martin say Javelin has a 94% “engagement success rate,” meaning that pulling the trigger virtually guarantees a hit. The massive, 19-pound tandem warhead helps ensure every hit is a kill. Early reports from Ukraine supported this, with one US official claiming 300 Javelins had destroyed 280 Russian vehicles (93%).
The UK also supplied advanced anti-tank weapons, notably the Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon (NLAW), the vehicle-mounted Brimstone, and more Javelins. Again these appeared to be extremely successful with one source in The Guardian claiming “an extraordinary 90% hit rate” for NLAW. Given these claims, the guided missiles supplied to Ukraine should have stopped the invasion in its caterpillar tracks. But things did not quite happen like that.
But the Devil is in the Numbers
As of October, according to Pentagon figures, the U.S. has supplied more than 10,000 Javelins, plus 9,000 older TOW guided missiles. The UK has supplied more than 12,000 anti-tank missiles, Ukraine also had some 7,000 locally-made Stugna-P guided anti-tank missiles, plus a couple of thousand Cobra and Kombat, and have produced perhaps 3,000 more Stugnas during the war. This gives a total of around 45,000 guided missiles.
Data analysts Oryx, who log every visually confirmed kill in the conflict, have recorded some 8,000 Russian armored vehicles destroyed, plus more than 2,000 captured and 1,000 abandoned. There have likely been more kills than have been verified, but those scored by guided missiles are necessarily on the front line and likely to have been recorded. If we count the kills and abandoned vehicles, if every one was a success for a guided missile, then 45,000 missiles have scored 9,000 kills, a kill rate of 20%. But the real figure will be much lower.
PGMs have not been the big killers. A RUSI report on the first year of the conflict downplayed their impact, stating: “Despite the prominence of anti-tank guided weapons in the public narrative, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades.”
In the latter stages of the war, FPV kamikazes have taken over as the main tank killers. Current estimates suggest 65% or more of armored vehicle losses are inflicted by FPVs and other small drones, not guided missiles. Many other systems are destroying Russian armor too. Anti-tank mines and Baba Yaga heavy drone bombers have made notable contributions; vehicles which are damaged by mines are usually finished off by smaller drones dropping grenades through open hatches.
Artillery continues to be a killer, and especially the guided weapons such as BONUS, a 155mm artillery round which ejects two target-seeking submunitions over the target area. There are also larger kamikaze drones. The U.S. has supplied some 4,000 under the Phoenix Ghost program, most of which carry antiarmor warheads. Early in the conflict an official from Zelensky’s office told the Ukrainian Defence Express that “580 of such units equals about 350 destroyed targets in the close rear.” This may be overstated, but indicates that Phoenix Ghosts have scored a significant number of kills.
The Pentagon has also supplied more than 120,000 unguided anti-armor weapons, Bazooka-type unguided rocket launchers. Even if the hit rate is very much lower than guided weapons, and most were used against other targets, these must have accounted for some Russian armor. Nor should we forget the Abrams, Leopard and Challenger tanks, or Ukraine’s own armored force, will have also been in action destroying Russian vehicles.
It would seem optimistic to claim that even as many as a third of the Russian vehicles were destroyed by PGMs. This gives a success rate more like 7% — not so much “one shot, one kill” as “twelve shots, one kill.” It is possible that not all of the anti-tank missiles have been expended, though the regular shipments and equally regular requests for more – early in the war a Ukrainian official told CNN they needed 500 Javelin missiles per day – suggest that missiles are fired soon after they are supplied.
Some of the missiles supplied may have been destroyed by enemy fire, captured, used in training or expended on low-value targets. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Javelins were fired against bunkers and foxholes rather than vehicles. Even so, these missing missiles must be considered as an overhead. They do not change the fundamental equation of “how many PGMs do we need to stop X-number of enemy tanks?”
How Many Missiles?
Before the war the US had a stockpile of about 20-25,000 Javelins. Around half has been eaten up by the war in Ukraine, a war which is far from over. It might be argued that U.S soldiers are better trained and would use the missiles more efficiently. On the other hand, the Ukrainians do now have more experience at destroying tanks with Javelins than anyone in the world. Clearly a major U.S. conflict would require more munitions. Otherwise, in simple terms, the Army will run out of missiles before the enemy runs out of tanks. The obvious solution would be to restock with an ever larger number of Javelins. However, their eye-watering cost — about $2 billion to replace the 10,000 missiles used – gives pause over whether this is value for money.
It appears that the majority of Russian armor is now being destroyed at much longer ranges than the Javelin can achieve by lower-cost systems. The Javelin was designed more than 30 years ago, modern electronics provide more capability far more affordably. FPV drones costing around $500 can knock out a tank more than 10 miles away, whereas the Javelin’s maximum range is under 3 miles. And while the Javelin operator needs to see the target to lock the missile on, FPVs can be flown into an area of known or suspected targets from the other side of a hill. Smaller warheads mean it may take several FPVs to destroy a target, but at that price it is possible.
Tactically, of course, if a tank is bearing down, an instant-kill weapon like the Javelin is needed. But other weapons can be added to the mix. A mixture of Javelins and small loitering munitions might work better than Javelins alone. A team with ten Javelins might, to be optimistic, hope to kill nine tanks. If U.S. FPVs cost ten times as much as the Ukrainian version (say $5,000, one fortieth of the cost of a $200k Javelin) , then the same team could be armed with five Javelins and two hundred FPVs, and perhaps do a lot more damage.
The Javelin remains a potent weapon. And the supply of U.S. Javelins to Ukraine has been an important part of the aid package. But future procurement plans should keep a close eye on the actual results achieved in combat and the potential of other weapon systems.
David Hambling is a freelance science and technology journalist and author based in South London. His non-fiction books include Weapons Grade, Swarm Troopers: How small drones will
conquer the world and We: Robot. His Lovecraftian science fiction includes the popular Harry Stubbs series set in 1920s South London, and his time-travel adventure City of Sorcerers will be out in 2022.