By Peter Dickinson
Atlantic Council
Dec 17, 2024
Putin’s quiet Syrian surrender reveals the weakness behind his intimidation tactics
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria took the whole world by surprise, but Vladimir Putin’s propaganda machine was among the first to react. After nine years of relentlessly demonizing all anti-Assad forces as “terrorists,” Kremlin TV suddenly began describing them in far more respectful tones as “armed opposition groups.” Meanwhile, Moscow officials were also soon suggesting that the newly ascendant rebels were not in fact dangerous religious radicals, but perfectly respectable potential partners who Russia could do business with.
This shameless shift in the Kremlin narrative is hardly surprising. After all, Putin is desperate to negotiate a deal with Syria’s new rulers that will allow him to retain control over naval and air bases that are vital for Russian interests throughout Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the significance of Russia’s dramatic change of tune cannot be overstated.
Russia’s Syrian intervention was the country’s first major military operation beyond the boundaries of the former USSR since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It did not come cheaply, with Putin investing tens of billions of dollars on a mixed force of military advisers, mercenary units, naval assets, and air power tasked with propping up the Syrian regime. For a long period, the gamble appeared to have paid off handsomely. Putin was widely recognized as the savior of Bashar Assad, and was able to use this newfound prestige to project Russian influence throughout the wider region.
Russia’s Syrian exploits were afforded blanket coverage throughout the country’s carefully curated information space. The Kremlin media spent much of the past decade trumpeting the war in Syria as a symbol of Russia’s return to Great Power status, with Moscow pundits routinely positioning the country’s military campaign as a righteous crusade against Western intrigues and Islamist forces of darkness. There have been endless documentaries, propaganda tours, and even a classical concert amid the rubble of a country devastated by Russian aerial bombardment. All this is now seemingly forgotten as the Kremlin seeks to ingratiate itself with the new powers that be in Damascus.
Putin’s readiness to surrender his entire propaganda position in Syria and quietly accept new military realities should now help the West to overcome its crippling fear of Russian escalation in Ukraine. Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost three years ago, the Western response has been hampered by concerns that support for Ukraine could provoke Russia into escalating its aggression and lead to a broadening of the conflict. Putin has skillfully exploited these fears, using a combination of nuclear threats and warnings of Russian red lines to
limit the delivery of Western military aid to Kyiv and impose absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.
This excessive Western caution has infuriated many in Kyiv, not least because Ukraine has repeatedly exposed Russia’s threats as empty. When Putin threatened to defend his Ukrainian conquests with nuclear weapons in September 2022 and declared “I’m not bluffing,” Ukraine promptly called his bluff and liberated the strategically vital southern Ukrainian city of Kherson. Instead of reaching for his nuclear briefcase, Putin simply ordered his defeated troops to retreat across the Dnipro River. Likewise, when Ukraine disregarded Kremlin bluster and proceeded to sink or damage around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, Putin did not go nuclear. On the contrary, he instructed his remaining warships to withdraw from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports.
The biggest blow to the myth of inevitable Russian escalation came in summer 2024, when Ukraine crossed the reddest of all Russian red lines by invading Russia itself. As Ukrainian troops flooded across the border and began occupying swathes of Russia’s Kursk Oblast, Putin’s response was telling. He made no attempt to rally his compatriots against the foreign invader or warn of impending nuclear war. Quite the opposite, in fact. Rather than raising the stakes, Putin consciously chose to downplay the entire Ukrainian offensive, referring to it as a mere “provocation.”
Putin’s underwhelming response to the fall of his Syrian ally Bashar Assad serves as a timely reminder that Western fears of Russian escalation are wildly exaggerated. In reality, whenever Putin finds himself confronted by a resolute opponent, he is inclined to retreat. Like all bullies, he seeks to overwhelm his victims with intimidation. However, as we have seen repeatedly in Ukraine, his threats are almost always hollow.
This is good news for advocates of a “peace through strength” strategy, including those within the incoming Trump administration. Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been his greatest success of the entire war in Ukraine, but it should now be abundantly clear that Russia’s saber-rattling is built on bluff.
The Kremlin’s inability to rescue its Syrian ally has revealed the humble reality behind Putin’s Great Power posturing. The Russian military is now obviously overextended by the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, while Putin is in a far weaker position than he would like us to believe. Crucially, he is also more than capable of completely rejecting his own propaganda and rewriting history when necessary. If confronted with the prospect of military defeat in Ukraine, there is every reason to believe he will retreat again, while ordering his media machine to save his blushes.
Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.