By JONATHAN SWEET and MARK TOTH
12/04/24
The Hill
It has been another bad week for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed faster than Afghanistan’s had in August 2021. Syrian rebels caught Putin’s armed forces by surprise and swept through Aleppo, forcing the Russians to vacate several military bases.
The Russian commander, Lieutenant General Sergey Kisel, had previously commanded Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army in the Kharkiv region of Ukraine, where they were driven back by a Ukrainian counterattack in late 2022. Now a two-time battlefield failure, he would do well to avoid open windows when he is recalled back to the Kremlin.
The fighting rages on, with Damascus clearly the goal. Unlike Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Assad passed on the ammo and “took the ride” with his family. He was safely evacuated to Russia, where his “extended family and associates own $40 million worth of luxury apartments in Moscow’s skyscraper district.”
And with Assad’s regime likely coming to an end, Russian influence in the region may be ending, too.
At risk now are two key military facilities: the Khmeimim airbase, from which Russian aircraft have been launching attacks against Syrian Rebels and civilians, and Tartus, home to Syria’s only naval base. And without these two bases, Russian operations in the Middle East, the Sahel region of Africa, and Sudan will likely grind to a halt as well.
Russian tactics remain the same as ever. Instead of attacking the Syrian rebels, they are targeting civilians in “liberated” population centers. But this tactic is having minimal effect on the foreign rebels leading the charge — the Turkish-backed collation of Islamist militant groups Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Designated as a terrorist group by the U.N. Security Council, this coalition has direct ties to al-Qaeda.
In hindsight, this is the result of Hamas’s ill-conceived Oct. 7 terrorist attack against Israel — likely directed by Iran with Russia’s support. Already preoccupied with their own problems, neither Russia nor Iran nor Hezbollah are in any position to come to Assad’s aide. Putin’s war with Ukraine has drained Russian resources, and Israel has weakened Iran and its proxies. The regional kaleidoscope is now shifting, and conditions are ripe for the “wider regional conflict” that the Biden administration feared.
For Moscow, there is more at risk than just Syria’s Mediterranean port. Putin also faces the possible loss of the Ochamchire district in the Georgian breakaway republic of Abkhazia — the
seaport to which he wants to move his Black Sea fleet, since Ukraine’s successful attacks forced it out of Sevastopol.
Russian colonialism is wearing thin in the Caucasus, too. In mid-November, protesters stormed the parliament of Abkhazia, demanding the resignation of Aslan Bzhania over an unpopular investment agreement with Moscow, “which critics feared would clear the way for wealthy Russian individuals and businesses to buy up property in the lush Black Sea region, pricing out locals.”
Georgians are still reeling from October’s election results, which President Salome Zourabichvili alleges was stolen as part of a “Russian special operation.” On November 28, they took to the streets in the capital city of Tbilisi when Dream Party Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced he was suspending talks to join the European Union.
Since then, the protests have grown. Demonstrations have taken place in at least eight cities as “tens of thousands of Georgians took to the streets again Sunday as mass nationwide protests entered their fourth night.”
Russia is overextended. Should the pro-Russian Dream Party-led government collapse, Abkhazia and South Ossetia could come back into play for Georgia. A significantly weakened conventional Russian military may not be able to retain these Russian-occupied territories. The loss of the port in Abkhazia would be detrimental to Russian influence in the Black Sea.
Adding to these issues was another public humiliation oriented towards Putin. During his visit to Astana, Kazakhstan, to attend the Collective Security Treaty Organization summit, Putin referred to Kazakhstan as a “Russian speaking country.” But when Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the summit audience, he did so in his native Kazakh. Anton Gerashchenko, a former advisor to Zelensky, described the incident as “trolling at a prohibitive level.”
This is the second country in the Russian-dominated security treaty to publicly snub Russia. In July, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia plans to withdraw from it.
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, losses continue to mount at a staggering pace. In November alone, while making gains in the Donetsk sector, Russia amassed over 45,720 casualties, also losing 307 tanks, 899 armored combat vehicles, and 884 pieces of artillery. November also ushered in a new single-day record of 2,030 Russian casualties. For purposes of comparison, only 14,500 Russian soldiers were killed in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989.
Yet through it all, Putin remains steadfast in his determination to win the war at any cost. Despite an economy in turmoil, he continues to double down on Ukraine. On Dec. 1, he approved a 2025 budget plan that hikes military spending from 28.3 percent to 32.5 percent — 13.5 trillion rubles (currently worth $145 billion). That does not sound like a man open to negotiations.
Putin evidently believes he can outlast Ukraine and the West. What he does not have — trained soldiers and munitions — he can purchase from North Korea and Iran, his “arsenals of evil.”
Putin’s Jenga tower is listing hard. Neither the Biden nor Trump administrations should consider anything short of a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, and the restoration of its 1991 borders. All instruments of national power — Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic — should be leveraged to end the war on the best terms possible for Ukraine.
Getting Putin to the negotiation table will require a Mike Tyson-like punch to the face. The unrestricted use of precision deep strike weapons is part of the solution — a condition setter. So is allowing Ukraine to interdict Russian and North Korean troops, equipment, and their munitions at the seaports, airfields, railheads and assembly areas in Russia before they arrive on the Ukrainian battlefield. These capabilities create room to maneuver for Ukrainian troops on the front lines so that they can eventually push Russian forces out of their country.
The U.S. must harness the warrior ethos of Generals Patton and Grant and enable Ukraine to wedge out that last Jenga piece: no sanctuary, relentless pressure and violence of action.
Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as an Army intelligence officer. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy.