Alexander Motyl
19fortyfive
Dec 18, 2024
On December 17, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, the head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops of the Russian Armed Forces, in Moscow. The SBU had served him with a notice of suspicion in absentia for using banned chemical weapons in Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine.
Kirillov and an aide fell victim to an explosion as they exited a residential building. The explosive device that killed them was hidden in a scooter parked near the building’s entrance. The bomb was detonated remotely.
The assassination is important for several reasons.
First, having employed banned chemical weapons, Kirillov was a war criminal, not unlike his ultimate boss, Russia’s self-elected president, Putin. His death is, therefore, a reminder to other Russian war criminals that they too may one day meet their untimely ends, if not by Ukrainian hands, then by a court in The Hague.
Second, the assassination took place in Moscow, Russia’s capital, testifying to the SBU’s reach and thereby underscoring the vulnerability of all Russian military elites and, by extension, their political counterparts. If even a general in Moscow isn’t safe, then no one is—even Putin and his circle of closest criminals.
Third, the SBU made a video of the assassination that is already making the rounds on Russian social media. As ordinary Russians watch Kirillov be killed, some may begin to wonder about Putin’s seemingly self-confident assertions that the war is going well. Western analysts and policymakers warning of impending Ukrainian collapse and inevitable Russian victory may also have second thoughts.
Fourth, organizing the assassination appears to have been relatively easy. The Ukrainians rented a car parked near the building in question a few days ago. A camera was installed inside the car; the lens was pointed at the exit, and the camera was wrapped in a cloth.
No fancy hi-tech gizmos appear to have been used, testifying both to Ukrainian ingenuity and Russian sluggishness.
We don’t know whether the SBU team that carried out the assassination consisted only of Ukrainians from Ukraine or also included local Moscow-based talent. If Ukrainians managed to cross the border and make their way to and from Moscow unscathed, then they would be testimony to the extreme porousness of Russia’s internal defenses.
If locals were involved, then Moscow would have to recognize that there may be many more Muscovites willing to help the Ukrainian security service.
Either way, the implications for Putin and his warmongers are sobering.
Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”