By John E. Herbst
Oct 7, 2024
Atlantic Council
This essay is part of the report “Transatlantic horizons: A collaborative US-EU policy agenda for 2025 and beyond,” which outlines an agenda for common action for the next US administration and European Commission.
The bottom line
Transatlantic support for Ukraine has been laudable, but much more is needed, particularly from Europe, given the political uncertainty in the United States. Regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election in November, policymakers must continue to supply assistance to Ukraine and eliminate restrictions placed on the use of the weapons provided. They should also make progress on the $50 billion loan to Ukraine using Russia’s state assets and secure Ukraine’s electricity grid to withstand Russia’s onslaught against civilian infrastructure.
State of play
The question of cooperation between the United States and the European Union (EU) regarding Ukraine can be looked at narrowly or broadly. A narrow approach focusing only on strict US-EU interaction risks missing critical elements of developing policy. So, a broad view that considers not just US-EU interaction but also the activities of NATO, key EU nations, and the Group of Seven (G7) is required.
In short, there has been closer coordination of US and EU/European policy toward Ukraine and Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine over the past year. This has resulted from the recognition in Washington and European capitals that they must cooperate more closely to achieve success in Ukraine and from the understanding in Europe that, with the rise of foreign policy populism in the United States, it might need to do more to ensure that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not win in Ukraine. These factors will likely extend in some fashion beyond the US presidential election. An additional complicating factor that has become evident since August is a weakening in German support for Ukraine reflected in the reluctance to pay for additional military assistance and naïve talk from the chancellery about the desirability of a renewed peace process. This means other nations in Europe must do more to ensure the necessary support for Ukraine.
These developments are most clear when looking at three key issues: Western military and economic support for Ukraine, the treatment of the $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets, and the efforts to ensure Ukraine’s economic resilience in the face of Russia’s infrastructure bombing campaign and to prepare for the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine.
Economic aid to sustain Ukraine has been an area of serious US-EU cooperation. Both parties have provided significant economic aid to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February of 2022. The United States has delivered $82.8 billion with a further $25.7 billion to be allocated
in economic aid, and Europe—as defined by EU institutions and member states, the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland—has delivered $121.5 billion with an additional $84 billion to be allocated. When it became clear early in 2023 that US economic aid to Ukraine was becoming politically controversial, the EU recognized that it would have to provide additional economic assistance.
This then repeated itself months later when a small group of populist Republicans in the House of Representatives began to block a $61 billion package of US military and economic aid that was supposed to pass in the fall of 2023. The delay of US military aid was particularly dangerous for Ukraine as Moscow launched a new offensive in the fall. Individual European countries unilaterally upped their military assistance to Ukraine; Czech President Petr Pavel announced at the February 2024 Munich Security Conference an initiative to buy on global markets ordnance needed by Ukraine, and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced that Denmark would transfer its entire stock of artillery to Ukraine. This urgent support helped Ukraine’s military hold the line until Congress finally passed the aid package in April.
The strategic imperative
A repeated situation in the United States is very much on the minds of EU leaders as they look at the upcoming US election. The Republicans in Congress who opposed the aid package—outspoken supporters of former US President Donald Trump—said immediately upon passage that it would be the last one. If Trump returns to the White House and agrees with these Republicans, US military aid will cease. Europeans are mindful of this possibility and will be prepared to step up if it comes to pass. But this is by no means the only—or even the likely—outcome of a Trump win in November. The former president gave House Speaker Mike Johnson the green light to put the aid package to a vote last spring, and he said at the time that Ukraine’s survival is important to the United States. If a Trump administration chose not to provide aid to Ukraine, the question immediately arises as to whether it would sell Ukraine weapons. There is no reason, in principle, for a Trump White House to reject this, and we could well face the interesting situation in which Trump would not only sell Ukraine weapons but also choose not to follow the misbegotten Biden practice of putting restrictions on their use.
There is one more security issue broader than Russia’s war on Ukraine that could impact US-EU relations if Trump returns to the White House, and that is the role of the United States in NATO. In office, Trump routinely slammed allies who were not spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense, and he also called into question the utility of the Alliance. However, his national security team understood that a strong NATO was critical for US security and global leadership, and they worked hard to ensure that US support for and leadership of NATO remained strong. If a second Trump administration chose to reduce the United States’ role in NATO, the EU would likely take greater steps to develop its own defense capabilities. That would be a natural development necessary for Europe’s defense against an aggressive Kremlin, but a blow to US leadership that would extend beyond Europe.
Regarding Russia’s frozen state assets, the main venue is the G7, which includes three major EU nations—France, Germany, and Italy—and the EU itself. With some help from Canada and the
United Kingdom, the Biden team did a superb job persuading the group to agree to provide Ukraine with a $50 billion loan based on the value of those frozen assets. The question now is whether the United States will work toward providing all or the vast majority of the $300 billion in frozen assets to Ukraine as advocated by Philip D. Zelikow, Robert B. Zoellick, and Lawrence H. Summers. Here, too, there is no certainty about what a Harris administration would do, but there is likely to be some overlap in the Treasury Department and other economic officials in the Biden and Harris teams.
With Trump there are even more questions. At one point, JD Vance, now the Republican vice-presidential nominee, criticized the efforts to use the frozen Russian state assets to reimburse Ukraine for the nearly $500 billion needed for reconstruction and recovery as a result of Moscow’s aggression, according to a World Bank estimate. But there is no apparent reason or principle for Trump supporters to oppose this use of the funds.
Another critical area of US-EU cooperation relates to maintaining Ukraine’s energy and economic resilience in the face of Moscow’s massive bombing campaign against civilian infrastructure and to prepare for the country’s postwar reconstruction. Here, the work together has been first rate, and the results impressive.
That work, aided by the United States, Japan, and other countries, ensured that Ukraine’s energy grid could power essential services during the winter of 2022–2023. Given Moscow’s more intensive bombing campaign over the past several months, Ukraine is likely to face a greater energy supply deficit this coming winter. The EU and the United States are working actively right now, again with others, to avert disaster. This will continue under a Harris administration. There is less certainty about this if Trump wins.
The same can be said about US-EU work on Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction. The EU and the United States have worked in a collegial fashion on reconstruction and, importantly, Washington recognizes that the EU accession process gives Brussels the lead on the critical issue of reform in Ukraine. However, the overall international reconstruction effort is focused more than necessary on abstract planning for the postwar period and not enough on the critical steps the international community should take now to bolster Ukraine’s economic and social resilience while promoting reform. In office, a President Kamala Harris would continue the major US role in reconstruction, although if Republicans control either the House or the Senate, the amount of US aid for reconstruction could be at risk. What a President Trump would do on this question is not certain. But if he chose to step back, the EU’s role would only grow larger.
Policy recommendations
No matter the outcome of the US presidential election, it is in the interest of the EU to seek maximum cooperation and coordination with the United States in providing Ukraine with the means to defeat Moscow’s aggression. Needed policy changes include:
Increase military and economic aid to Ukraine, regardless of what happens in Washington. The countries of Europe must continue to provide the substantial military and financial aid Ukraine needs and must fight the tendency, currently evident in Germany, to withhold new assistance.
Indeed, if, as a result of the presidential election, the United States decides to sharply reduce its aid to Ukraine, the EU and individual European countries must be ready to provide additional aid.
Lift foolhardy restrictions on Ukraine’s use of weapons. European countries in NATO should remove all restrictions on Ukraine’s use of their weapons and encourage the United States to do the same.
Deliver frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. The EU and relevant European states should move energetically, in coordination with the United States, Canada, and Japan, to provide Ukraine with the $50 billion loan based on the frozen Russian state assets. They must also find an expeditious way to provide the principal of those assets to Ukraine.
Secure Ukraine’s electric grids. The EU has recently announced substantial financing for this goal. The United States and the EU must repeat their successful cooperation from the winter of 2022 and 2023 to enhance efforts to help Ukraine provide enough electricity through the coming winter.
Bury Nord Stream 2. Germany must give up the pipedream of reviving the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Russia and the Biden administration should cease efforts to block congressional removal of sanctions on the pipeline.
John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as the United States’ ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.