The U.S., once firmly aligned with Ukraine, has been trying to broker a deal to end the war started by the Kremlin’s invasion.
By Eli Stokols
March 24, 2025
POLITICO
In seeking a historic peace accord between Russia and Ukraine, President Donald Trump has presented himself as an agnostic arbiter focused only on bringing the three-year war to an end.
But his divergent approach to the parties — quick to apply pressure on a more vulnerable ally Ukraine, more patience and gentle coaxing for the aggressor in Moscow — reflects his own perception of a stark power imbalance. Ukraine, as he memorably told President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office last month, doesn’t “have the cards.”
It’s true that Ukraine, dependent on defense aid from Washington and Europe, is in the weaker position should this war of attrition grind on for years. But Trump has done several things to weaken Zelenskyy’s hand.
The U.S. is leading talks with officials from both countries in Saudi Arabia this week, hoping to make additional progress toward a broader ceasefire. Here is a look at some of the bargaining chips Trump has given away that could have been used to pressure Russia.
Giving Putin multiple phone calls after Biden cut him off
Trump has done little to hide his eagerness for a rapprochement with Russia, reengaging with Putin in a 90-minute phone conversation shortly after taking office. That ended three years of isolation by the U.S. under President Joe Biden, who ended dialogue with Putin following his Feb. 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Another call on Tuesday, which appears to have been longer than the first, occurred after Putin refused to accept the terms of a 30-day ceasefire that the U.S. and Ukraine had already agreed on.
Had Trump held out longer on speaking to Putin, he’d have had greater leverage with the Kremlin to insist on additional concessions related to the war.
Holding talks with Russia without Ukraine present
The calls between Trump and Putin were just the start. Senior U.S. and Russian officials met face to face in Saudi Arabia in mid-February and outlined a plan to restart bilateral cooperation on several fronts. That included restoring staffing at their respective embassies in Washington and Moscow, potential economic cooperation and even the easing of sanctions imposed as a consequence to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Those initiatives could have been held in reserve, conditioned on Russia and Ukraine reaching a peace deal. That they were not, and that neither Ukraine nor European allies had a place at the table, clarified how the new administration was no longer aligning or coordinating with traditional allies.
Talking explicitly about what Ukraine may have to give up
While Trump has brushed off questions about what Russia should have to give up as part of a peace deal, he and top aides have been explicit about Ukraine needing to relinquish some of its sovereign territory currently controlled by Russia. National security adviser Michael Waltz has described that as “realistic” given the situation on the battlefield after three years of war.
And over the last week, Trump has stated that there have already been discussions about which country would control various regions of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Last week, he even floated that Ukraine, if it hoped to maintain control of the facility, might consider allowing U.S. interests to run the plant following the war.
Trump’s determination to exact a price from Ukraine has been presented publicly as a means toward ensuring America recoups the $120 billion in defense aid it’s provided since the war began. Despite concerns that the president was trying to extort Ukraine, Zelenskyy has expressed a desire to sign the minerals deal as a sign of its commitment to the peace process and Trump’s diplomacy more broadly. Russia, however, hasn’t had to do the same.
Applying max pressure, but only to Ukraine
Beyond erupting at Zelenskyy in the Oval Office after he publicly questioned Russia’s seriousness about ending the war, Trump has shown a consistent willingness to apply leverage to pressure Ukraine’s wartime leader. He temporarily cut off all U.S. defense aid and halted intelligence sharing following the White House blow-up, moves that were reversed after Ukraine agreed to the 30-day ceasefire proposal.
Beyond that, he has repeated Putin’s call for new elections in Ukraine, which is unable to hold elections while under martial law, and at one point even referred to Zelenskyy, who was democratically elected, as a “dictator.”
Ruling out security guarantees for Ukraine and NATO membership in the longer term
Trump has refused to consider offering American hard power to guarantee Ukraine’s security following a possible truce, leaving Europe in a scramble to boost defense spending and production. The furthest he’s gone is to offer an economic agreement — giving the U.S. a major stake in Ukraine’s future profits from rare earth minerals — as a de facto security guarantee, suggesting that Putin could be deterred from launching new attacks by the presence of Americans. “Trump is not demanding from Putin the same level of instant and total agreement he demanded from Zelenskyy,” said Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland and now senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Trump has threatened Putin in social media posts that he could ratchet up economic sanctions on Russia, before retreating quickly to a posture of suggesting that Ukraine is more of an
impediment to the peace talks. Last week, after the Russian leader refused to agree to the full 30-day ceasefire the U.S. and Ukraine had signed off on, Trump opted not to criticize his foot-dragging and instead praised his willingness to halt attacks on energy infrastructure as a positive step.
Ending efforts to hold Russia accountable
Following Trump’s phone call with Putin last Tuesday, the U.S. withdrew from a multinational group meant to investigate the leaders responsible for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including Putin. The administration also cut funding for Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab, which had detailed the mass deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
Amid questions from lawmakers, including some Republicans, the administration said it was reviewing the actions. But the recent moves align with the decision by several national security agencies to halt coordinated efforts to counter Russian cyberattacks and disinformation.
Both sides-ing the conflict
Trump has scoffed at suggestions that he adhere to the moral red line that, for three years before he took office, had kept the U.S. and other democratic allies unified in opposition to Russia’s brazen invasion. You can’t be effective as an impartial arbiter, the thinking goes, if you’re partial to one side.
In accepting Putin’s view of what he calls the war’s “root causes” — that Russia had to invade because of Ukraine’s desire to join NATO — the administration has legitimized the Kremlin’s position that the independence of a number of former Soviet socialist republics remains an unsettled matter. “In my 68 years on this Earth, I’ve never ever seen a situation where there isn’t two sides to a story,” Trump’s lead negotiator with Russia, Steve Witkoff, said in an interview over the weekend. “It’s just never as black and white as people want to portray. So there are grievances on both sides.”
Trump and his team are putting off dealing with the fundamental impasse at the heart of the conflict — Putin’s deeply held belief that Ukraine should not be independent, said Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and now the president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “You’re not going to get a deal without Ukraine agreeing,” said Daalder. “The big weakness Trump has is thinking he and Putin can dictate a deal. If he’s not going to provide Ukraine with arms or security guarantees, he’s giving up his leverage with Zelenskyy, who may well reject a lopsided peace deal and decide to keep fighting with backing from Europe.”
Eli Stokols is a White House and foreign affairs correspondent at POLITICO, covering the inner workings of Donald Trump’s presidency, national security and diplomacy. He brings nearly a decade of experience on the White House beat, including a run as co-author of POLITICO’s West Wing Playbook newsletter during the Biden years. He rejoined POLITICO in 2022 after nearly five years covering the White House for the Los Angeles Times and Wall Street Journal. Prior to that, he covered the 2016 election at POLITICO. A southern California native, Stokols began his journalism career in Louisiana and Colorado. He is a graduate of UC Berkeley, where he pitched for the Cal baseball team (whenever they had a safe lead of five runs or more); and he holds a master’s degree from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.