Bogdan Maftei
The Erudite Elders
Oct 5, 2024
Between May and July 2024, Russia experienced an exceptionally high number of casualties in its war with Ukraine. According to estimates from the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, around 70,000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded during this period, averaging nearly 1,000 per day. This heavy toll has led analysts to revise their predictions, suggesting that Russia could face up to 1.7 million casualties by the time the war ends. This raises critical questions: How many more soldiers will Russia lose in its so-called “Special Military Operation,” and what are the long-term effects on the Russian military’s strength and the stability of the Russian government?
Russia’s strategic goals in the war in Ukraine seem to have shifted significantly. At first, it looked like Russia aimed for a complete takeover of Ukraine or the removal of the post-Euromaidan government in Kyiv. Now, its focus seems to have narrowed to gaining full control over the four oblasts, Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia, which it claimed to annex in 2022. Given the current rate of Russian military losses, it could take around five years for Russia to gain control of these regions. If Russia continues on its current path, this extended timeline would strain its military resources and lead to casualty figures not seen since major wars of the 20th century. This projection shows the heavy human and material costs Russia appears willing to endure to meet its revised objectives in Ukraine.
As of July 24th, 2024, British intelligence estimates that Russia has suffered around 550,000 casualties over nearly two and a half years of war. This includes both those killed and wounded, though the exact numbers are unclear due to limited Russian official reporting. The trend, however, points to increasing losses. Several factors suggest Russian casualties will continue to rise significantly in the coming years. A key reason is the shift in Ukraine’s military strategy. Acknowledging the prolonged nature of the war, Ukrainian leadership has adapted to a war of attrition rather than aiming for swift, large-scale offensives. After setbacks during the Zaporizhzhia offensive last year, Ukrainian forces have adjusted their tactics, focusing less on gaining territory and more on defensive operations that inflict heavy casualties on Russian troops, destroy their equipment, and reduce Ukraine’s own losses.
Ukraine’s defensive strategy takes advantage of its strengths in asymmetric warfare and its growing expertise in modern military technology. A clear example is the prolonged Battle of Avdiivka, where Russian forces faced extremely high casualty rates. By December 2023, data showed that roughly 3,000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded for every square mile of territory they managed to capture around the city. This was despite Ukraine’s severe shortages in artillery ammunition and perceived shortcomings in drone warfare at the time. Since then, the
situation has changed significantly. Ukraine has made major strides in its use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), especially fast-moving, small First-Person View (FPV) drones. These drones have become a key part of Ukraine’s strategy, allowing them to target Russian assets with precision while keeping Ukrainian soldiers out of harm’s way. Ukrainian officials have stressed how important these drones are in balancing the fight against Russia’s larger forces.
In response to Russia’s advances in drone warfare in the second half of 2023, Ukraine made a significant push to strengthen its own UAV capabilities. President Volodymyr Zelensky set an ambitious goal of producing one million FPV drones, making it a top priority for the government. By February 2024, Ukraine was on track to meet or even surpass this target. These drones have played a key role in destroying thousands of Russian tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces. Ukrainian drone pilots have shown impressive skill, often navigating drones through difficult terrain to strike high-value targets, including enemy troops hiding in buildings. Meanwhile, Russia has struggled to keep up in the drone warfare arena. Russian FPV drone activity peaked in January 2024 and has since declined. Adding to their challenges is Russia’s lagging electronic warfare capabilities, as many of their jamming devices and counter-UAV systems have proven ineffective against Ukraine’s increasingly advanced drones. This has left Russian units vulnerable to drone attacks as they attempt to move through contested areas.
The rise in drone warfare, along with improvements in Ukraine’s artillery capabilities, indicates that Russian forces will face growing challenges on the battlefield. While Ukraine continues to deal with artillery ammunition shortages, the situation has improved compared to the critical period between October 2023 and April 2024, when the U.S. temporarily paused military aid. With an increased supply of artillery shells, Ukrainian forces have been able to intensify their defensive fire, leading to higher Russian casualty rates. Addressing Ukraine’s ammunition shortages has required complex international logistics and diplomacy. During the winter of 2023–2024, Ukraine’s Western allies negotiated deals to transfer over one million artillery shells from non-Western countries, including South Korea, Turkey, and South Africa, with the Czech Republic playing a key role in coordinating these efforts. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský announced the first shipments’ arrival in June 2024, with more deliveries in the following months. These additional resources have reportedly helped Ukrainian artillery achieve fire superiority in some areas along the 1,100-kilometer front line, though specific locations remain undisclosed for security reasons.
Artillery has played a decisive role in the war, accounting for about 80% of all casualties on both sides. With improved ammunition supplies and more effective use of drones for targeting and reconnaissance, Ukrainian forces have become better at damaging Russian units trying to advance. This weakens Russia’s traditional advantage in massed artillery fire and complicates its operational planning. In response, Russia has taken steps to increase its military manpower to make up for its losses. In June 2024, President Vladimir Putin announced that 700,000 Russian troops were involved in operations in Ukraine. However, given the length of the front line and the high rate of losses, this number is not enough for Russia to achieve its strategic goals. To address this, the Russian government has introduced new policies to boost recruitment and mobilization.
One policy aimed at boosting military recruitment is the significant increase in financial incentives for service. In July 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defence raised the signing bonus for new recruits to $22,000, nearly double what was offered at the end of 2023. Including salary and benefits, the annual compensation now totals about $60,750. This is competitive with pay in Western militaries and higher than what many workers earn in critical sectors of the Russian economy, such as the oil and gas industry, where monthly wages range from $1,375 to $1,460. While this higher pay has attracted more recruits, it has also led to unintended economic effects. The private sector, especially industries key to Russia’s economic stability, is facing labor shortages as workers are drawn to the more lucrative military roles. The energy sector, vital for Russia’s export revenue and a buffer against international sanctions, is struggling with staffing issues that could hurt production and, in turn, the wider economy.
The financial strain of the war is further worsened by the costs of caring for wounded soldiers and compensating the families of those killed in action. Analysts from Johns Hopkins University and the Center for the National Interest estimate that these expenses now make up about 6% of Russia’s annual budget, around $26 billion. Overall military spending consumes about 40% of the national budget, illustrating the significant pressure the war is placing on Russia’s finances. In addition to financial incentives, Russia has revised its conscription policies to expand the pool of potential recruits. The upper age limit for mandatory military service has been raised from 27 to 30, and the government has made the conscription process more efficient using digital platforms. Draft notices are now sent through a centralized government portal, and individuals who fail to respond can face penalties regardless of their interaction with the system. Critics have called this a “digital gulag,” expressing concerns about personal freedoms and government overreach. Additionally, the age limit for reservists eligible for mobilization has been raised to 70, signaling Russia’s readiness to use older personnel to meet military needs.
Russia’s battlefield tactics have also contributed to its rising casualty numbers. One notable approach involves sending waves of infantry assaults directly against heavily fortified Ukrainian positions. These frontal attacks, often carried out with little support, aim to force Ukrainian forces to reveal their firing positions, especially artillery. Ukrainian soldiers have dubbed these operations “meat assaults” due to the heavy Russian losses they result in. The psychological and physical toll on both sides is severe, with Ukrainian defenders facing relentless attacks, sometimes multiple times in a single day. While this strategy occasionally provides Russian commanders with valuable insights, such as pinpointing artillery locations for future strikes by tanks and long-range artillery, it comes at a steep human cost. The high casualties require a constant flow of new troops, further straining Russia’s recruitment and mobilization efforts.
Facing limitations in domestic recruitment, Russia has turned to foreign sources for additional manpower. Ukrainian intelligence reports suggest that Russia is actively recruiting mercenaries from African nations like Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda. These recruits are being offered a monthly salary of $2,200, far exceeding the average annual income in those countries, along with a $2,000 signing bonus, health insurance, and the promise of Russian citizenship for both the recruits and their families. These foreign fighters have been integrated into units informally called the “Africa Corps,” which has been seen participating in
combat operations in areas like Kharkiv since mid-May 2024. In addition, Russia has used more covert methods to boost its ranks, such as pressuring foreign students in Russia to join the military and employing human trafficking schemes that trick individuals into enlisting under false pretenses.
While deploying foreign troops helps bolster Russia’s manpower, it brings challenges related to training, integration, and overall effectiveness. Cultural and language barriers, varying levels of military experience, and potential legal issues under international law make the use of these forces more complicated. Additionally, these recruits are often placed in high-risk positions, resulting in high casualty rates and raising ethical concerns about their treatment. Despite these efforts to boost troop numbers, Russia still faces major obstacles in reaching its strategic goals. At the NATO summit in Washington in July 2024, officials expressed doubts about Russia’s ability to launch large-scale offensives that could secure significant Ukrainian territory. A senior NATO official, speaking anonymously, pointed out that Russia lacks both the manpower and sufficient ammunition stockpiles to decisively change the course of the war.
Russia’s heavy reliance on artillery has long been central to its military strategy, but the sustained high rates of fire have severely depleted its stockpiles. Although domestic production has ramped up, it has not been able to meet the growing operational needs. Russia’s outreach to North Korea and Iran for additional ammunition and military support highlights the logistical challenges it faces. President Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024 underscored the importance of these partnerships, though the extent of the support remains under international scrutiny and could lead to further sanctions. Adding to Russia’s difficulties is the improvement in Ukraine’s defenses. With stronger fortifications, better training, and the effective use of Western-supplied weapons, Ukraine has made Russian offensive operations more difficult and costly. Ukrainian forces have also enhanced their counter-battery capabilities, using advanced radar systems and drones to locate and strike Russian artillery units. Russia’s potential to significantly expand its manpower adds further risks. Putin has shown a willingness to use all available means to achieve his goals, even at the risk of provoking domestic unrest. Broader mobilization efforts that affect major urban centers like Moscow and Saint Petersburg could push public tolerance to its limits and challenge the regime’s ability to manage internal dissent.
Russia’s foreign policy has long been driven by a desire for defensible borders and strategic depth, and this doctrine is especially relevant in the context of its war in Ukraine. The Volgograd Gap, a critical geographic corridor between the Black and Caspian Seas, has been a focal point of Russian security concerns for centuries. This gap, due to its relatively flat and open terrain, has historically been a vulnerable entry point into Russian territory, making it a key area for defensive strategies. Securing this region and its surrounding areas has been essential to Russia’s broader military objectives, which is why control over eastern Ukraine aligns with these long-standing goals. By extending its reach into eastern Ukraine, Russia hopes to create a buffer zone that would not only protect the Volgograd Gap but also provide greater strategic depth, a concept rooted in Russian military thinking since the time of the Tsars and later reinforced during the Soviet era. However, the pursuit of these territorial gains has come at a tremendous cost, both in terms of military resources and human lives, as the war grinds on with no clear end in sight.
The price of closing the Volgograd Gap and securing eastern Ukraine could be staggering, with estimates suggesting Russia may face up to 1.7 million casualties if current trends continue. This raises the specter of a Pyrrhic victory for Russia, where the human and economic toll outweighs any strategic advantages gained. The massive loss of life, coupled with the strain on military resources, has already put a significant burden on the Russian economy, which is grappling with international sanctions and reduced revenue from key sectors like energy. Furthermore, the potential for domestic unrest looms large as recruitment and mobilization efforts intensify, drawing more men into a war that many Russians may view as increasingly futile. If Russia continues on this path, the social and political costs could become too great for the Kremlin to manage, leading to instability within the government. On the other hand, failing to secure control over eastern Ukraine and the Volgograd Gap could be equally damaging for the regime’s legitimacy, as it would represent a significant defeat of Russia’s core security objectives. In this sense, Russia is caught between two perilous outcomes: a victory that comes at an unsustainable cost or a failure that could undermine the very foundations of the state.